Part 1: Rebounding, Albeit Slowly by Regional Studies Institute, Old Dominion University
Rebounding, Albeit Slowly
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 20144
REBOUNDING, ALBEIT SLOWLY
T
he Great Recession inflicted significant damage upon the citizenry of Hampton Roads. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that our regional rate of 
unemployment more than doubled from 3.4 percent in April 2008 to 8.2 percent in January 2010. Meanwhile, between 2007 and 2010, we lost almost 
40,000 jobs in Hampton Roads (see Graph 1).    
Even so, cushioned by Department of Defense (DOD) spending, our regional 
recession turned out to be milder than that of the nation. When the U.S. rate of 
unemployment topped out at 9.9 percent in March and April of 2010, this was 
considerably higher than our regional 8.2 percent peak.
DOD spending in Hampton Roads was indeed the key to our more sedate 
economic decline; it increased in our region by an average of 6.1 percent 
annually between 2000 and 2011. Unfortunately, this powerful growth engine 
began to sputter in 2012 and as Graph 2 indicates, absolute DOD spending in 
Hampton Roads in 2014 likely will barely exceed our 2011 level and actually 
be below our 2012 level.   
DOD expenditures on military personnel have been a significant driving force in 
our regional economy for at least the last decade. One can observe in Table 1 
that the average compensation of an active-duty military member in our region 
increased by more than 95 percent between 2001 and 2011, while average 
federal civilian employees’ compensation increased a bit more than 54 percent, 
average state and local government employees’ compensation by 39 percent, 
and average private non-farm employees’ compensation by almost 31 percent. 
However, the political/economic energy for these DOD compensation increases 
is dissipating; it appears that the next wage increase will be 1 percent.   
Note that the compensation data reported in Table 1 include the value of all 
fringe benefits received by active-duty personnel. Thus, an economic value is 
placed on all food, uniform and housing allowances, etc. Active-duty military 
wages did not increase by 95 percent between 2001 and 2011.    
Ironically, the deceleration of defense spending has enabled us to achieve a 
long-sought regional goal – the diversification of our regional economy. As 
Graph 3 reveals, in 2014, we expect that only 42.2 percent of our regional 
economic activity will be directly and indirectly attributable to DOD spending; 
this would be down from our recent peak of 46.6 percent in 2011. Alas, we 
have achieved our economic diversification for the wrong reason – a decline in 
DOD spending rather than a spirited increase in our private-sector activity.  
In any case, while we have been experiencing economic growth in Hampton 
Roads (roughly 1.54 percent over the past year after removing inflation), this has 
not translated to significant job growth. A review of Graph 1 demonstrates that 
we have yet to recover all the jobs we lost in the Great Recession. Our regional 
economic recovery has trailed that of both the Commonwealth and the United 
States. As Graph 4 illustrates, the country finally recovered all of the jobs it lost 
in the recession in May of this year and Virginia is less than 1 percent away 
from doing so. We, however, are sputtering along at almost 4 percent below 
our 2007 peak of 776,600 regional jobs.  
There are, however, some bright spots in our regional economic picture. In the 
next few sections we will examine them and our prospects for the future.
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GRAPH 1
TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999-2013 (THOUSANDS OF JOBS)
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GRAPH 2
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2014











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Spending increased from 2000 to 2011 by 6.1% 
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATED AVERAGE COMPENSATION (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR SELECTED CATEGORIES 
IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001, 2011 AND 2012





Military $47,077 $92,054 $93,346 95.5% 1.4%
Federal Civilian 
Government Employees
$63,631 $98,296 $98,166 54.5% -0.1%
State and Local 
Government Employees
$40,251 $55,931 $56,334 39.0% 0.7%
Private Non-farm $29,155 $38,166 $39,499 30.9% 3.5%
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GRAPH 4
RECESSION RECOVERY IN THE U.S., VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS 
MEASURED BY THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL JOBS RESTORED, 2007-2014*
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Data for 2014 are through May.
GRAPH 4
 Recession Recovery in the U.S., Virginia and Hampton Roads 
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Defense Spending
In light of the data just presented, is it possible to pose DOD 
spending as a positive factor in our economic future? Yes, 
but primarily because over the next few years we will not 
experience the much more substantial reductions in defense 
spending that might have occurred.  
In order to decipher what DOD spending is likely to be in the future, it is 
necessary to distinguish between “discretionary” DOD spending and “overseas 
contingency” DOD spending. Discretionary defense spending is best viewed as 
constituting the DOD’s base budget. Overseas contingency defense spending 
relates to wars and conflicts that are thought to be temporary, for example, U.S. 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In FY 2015, $85 billion is designated for 
such purposes.  
There is, however, a third category worthy of note: “support” spending related 
to U.S. defense needs that includes certain expenditures in the Department 
of State, cyber security in the Department of Justice, nuclear security in the 
Department of Energy and the now famous Department of Veterans Affairs. Table 
2 summarizes what has been happening to these three classes of defense or 
defense-related expenditures since FY 2009. With the exception of FY 2012 
and FY 2013, support expenditures have been growing steadily over time and 
their growth is not likely to abate. This reflects both the continued growth of 
fringe benefit expenditures (including health) for active-duty and retired personnel 
and an increased emphasis on nonconventional warfare.
The three lines in Graph 5 illustrate the impact of DOD budget cuts in recent 
years. The blue line depicts discretionary DOD spending caps between FY 
2012 and FY 2021 approved under the Budget Control Act of 2011. The 
red line illustrates the additional spending cap reductions – also known as 
sequestration – that were also set in place in the Budget Control Act of 2011. 
The green line reflects sequestration relief (increased DOD spending caps) that 
was approved in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. The area of the green 
trapezoid is equal to $31.5 billion and represents DOD spending caps that 
have been restored for FY 2013 and FY 2014.    
TABLE 2
TOTAL DEFENSE-RELATED SPENDING (IN BILLIONS OF $) 








FY 2008 $686.0 $197.5 N.A. N.A.
FY 2009 $513.5 $145.9 $149.2 $808.7 
FY 2010 $530.1 $167.3 $159.5 $852.2 
FY 2011 $528.1 $159.4 $165.0 $862.7 
FY 2012 $530.4 $126.5 $159.3 $816.2 
FY 2013 $495.5 $  93.0 $163.8 $752.3 
FY 2014 $496.0 $  91.9 $168.6 $756.5 
FY 2015 $495.6 $  85.4 $175.4 $756.4 
Source: http://useconomy.about.com/od/usfederalbudget/p/military_budget.htm
The salient point is that we were spared many of the 
sequestration cuts that had been scheduled for FY 2013 and 
FY 2014. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 also provided a 
1 percent pay increase for active-duty personnel and a 4.2 
percent hike in housing allowances.  
What does all this mean for Hampton Roads? In a nutshell, it’s 
not going to be as bad as it might have been. Graph 6, which 
shows the region’s median household income, demonstrates 
this. We’ve averted the largest DOD cuts, but smaller cuts 
remain. Further, Congress has blocked any consideration of 
closing military bases, so that potential problem is off the 
table, if only for a few years.  
Of greater concern to us should be four potentially adverse 
trends relating to DOD spending. First, the total number of 
active-duty military personnel in our region continues to 
decline and is now about 20,000 below our numbers at the 
beginning of this century. The decline between FY 2010 and FY 2012 
was relatively modest where the U.S. Navy was concerned – 1,133 fewer 
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active-duty individuals, or about 1.6 percent of its regional complement. 
However, we should not forget that active-duty personnel and their dependents 
buy homes, purchase automobiles, attend colleges, patronize restaurants, etc. 
We will feel the economic effects.  
Second, the U.S. Navy continues to grow smaller in terms 
of the number of active ships in the fleet. In FY 2010, 72 ships 
were homeported in Hampton Roads, but this had fallen to 68 by FY 2012, 
continuing a long-term trend. Smaller ship numbers eventually translate into 
diminished ship repair and maintenance activity, which is a multibillion-dollar 
industry in our region. More than the Norfolk Naval Shipyard will be affected. 
Firms such as BAE Systems and Colonna’s Shipyard will experience reduced 
business and subsequently find it challenging to refocus their attention toward 
non-DOD activities.   
Third, the escalating costs of building and producing major 
defense assets, such as aircraft carriers and state-of-the-
art fighter airplanes, mean that the DOD will not be able to 
purchase as many in the future. They’re simply too expensive. This will 
result in lower levels of activity at firms such as Newport News Shipbuilding. In 
the long term, if fewer such assets are being produced, this also will accelerate 
the decline in the number of active-duty personnel and civilian counterparts 
employed by the DOD.  
Fourth, the military challenges and conflicts the United States 
has confronted in the 21st century have not always matched 
up well with the powerful traditional military assets the 
country has the ability to deploy. We clearly have the most powerful 
military force on earth and any and all opponents shrink from entering any 
battlefield where the U.S. is able to deploy its traditional military assets, such 
as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and advanced fighter aircraft. However, 
growing in importance are anti-partisan and anti-terrorist operations, the use 
of Special Forces, cyber warfare and a variety of policing and prevention 
activities. If this trend away from the use of traditional military assets continues, 
it is likely to be disadvantageous for Hampton Roads, because we are 
substantially (though not totally) a traditional, conventional forces bastion.       
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GRAPH 5
CAPS ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY SPENDING, FY 2012 TO FY 2021
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Discretionary defense spending cap increases by about $19 billion in FY 2014 
compared to FY 2013, but is about $32 billion below the levels imposed under BCA.       
GRAPH 5 
Caps on Department of Defense Discretionary Spending, FY 2012 to FY 2021 
- - -
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GRAPH 6
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME, HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1998-2014
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Employment And Job 
Markets In Hampton Roads
Even though we have yet to recover all of the jobs we lost in the Great 
Recession, some sectors of our economy have done rather well. Graph 7 
reports sectoral winners and losers in Hampton Roads in 2013 in terms of jobs 
gained and lost. Continuing a long-term trend that was not altered by recession 
(see Graph 8), the health care and social assistance sector exhibited a strong 
increase in employment. Reflecting economic recovery, professional and 
business services, retail and wholesale trade, and even manufacturing, recorded 
significant increases in jobs.  
At the other end of the spectrum, government jobs declined across the board 
– federal, state and local – within Hampton Roads. This is indicative both of 
disappointing tax collections and citizen resistance to expanded governmental 
activity. Governments collectively shed approximately 1,600 jobs in our region 
in 2013.
Hampton Roads, however, is not a high-wage oasis. Table 3 reports average 
weekly wages in various economic sectors at the end of 2003 and at the end 
of 2013. Our largest growth in jobs has been occurring in health care and 
social assistance, but average weekly wages in this sector grew only 27.4 
percent in Hampton Roads over the 2003-2013 period. Unfortunately, during 
the same years, the CPI-U (consumer price index for all urban consumers) grew 
26.5 percent. Thus, these workers experienced only a scant 1 percent increase 
in their real incomes. Following national trends, the big winners regionally in 
terms of increased real incomes over this decade were finance and insurance 
workers, whose real incomes increased by almost 16 percent. The big losers 
were retail trade workers (many of whom are salespeople) – their real incomes 
fell by 13.6 percent during this decade.
TABLE 3
AVERAGE PRIVATE-SECTOR WEEKLY WAGES IN SELECTED 







Construction $709 $938 $246 (34.7%)
Manufacturing $908 $1,120 $212 (23.3%)
Wholesale Trade $947 $1,176 $229 (24.2%)
Retail Trade $405 $457 $52 (12.8%)
Transportation 
and Warehousing
$790* $1,066 $276 (34.9%)
Information $795* $1,044 $249 (31.3%)
Finance and 
Insurance
$867 $1,234 $367 (42.3%)
Professional and 
Business Services
$1,075 $1,430 $355 (33.0%)
Health Care and 
Social Assistance




$242 $303 $61 (27.4%)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages in Private Sector and the Old 
Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Wage data shown for Transportation and Warehousing 
and Information industry are for second quarter 2005. Data for Health Care and Social Assistance are for first 
quarter 2007.
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Hence, in Hampton Roads, we find ourselves in a good news/bad news 
situation with respect to jobs and labor markets.  
The good:
•  Our regional rate of unemployment (5.8 percent in July 2014) continues to 
hover well below the U.S. unemployment rate (6.5 percent in July 2014). 
•  As Graph 9 reveals, the number of people seeking unemployment insurance 
in Hampton Roads continues to decline.
•  All things considered, the private-sector economy in our region has not 
performed too badly. There is private-sector economic growth and there has 
been some job creation.
The bad:
•  We simply aren’t creating enough new jobs; we have yet to replace all of the 
jobs we lost in the Great Recession.
•  Labor force participation in Hampton Roads (and in the U.S.) continues to 
decline, reflecting the reality that an increasing number of people of working 
age are not seeking work. Hence, they are not counted as unemployed.
•  Growth in real, inflation-adjusted incomes has been minimal overall and in 
many job sectors income growth has not kept up with the rise in the Consumer 
Price Index over the past decade.
•  While we are doing better than the U.S., our July 2014 unemployment rate 
(5.8 percent) was higher than Virginia’s (5.4 percent) and Richmond’s (5.7 
percent).
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GRAPH 7
JOBS GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2013
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GRAPH 8
JOB GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2007-2013 (IN THOUSANDS)
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GRAPH 9
TOTAL MONTHLY UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS FOR HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2004 THROUGH MAY 2014 
(12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE)





















































































































High: 18,257 (January 2010) 
Low: 8,699 (June 2006) 
GRAPH 9 
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The Port
“If you want to know who the players are, you’d better buy a program.” This 
baseball park bromide also applies to the Port of Virginia, where both the Port’s 
management and the membership of the Virginia Port Authority board have 
changed several times in recent years.  
Politically, governors Bob McDonnell and Terry McAuliffe are far apart, but both 
have gone on the record expressing dissatisfaction with various aspects of the 
operation of the Port. During his term, McDonnell considered privatizing the 
management of the Port, but this proposal succumbed to a flurry of objections. 
More recently, McAuliffe has been vocal in his criticisms of financial losses 
sustained by the Port and his administration also appears to be dissatisfied with 
the Port’s lease arrangements with APM Maersk in Portsmouth.  
Meanwhile, the Port is more active than ever. It recorded an 
all-time high in cargo tonnage handled in 2013 and is on track 
to set another record in 2014 (see Graph 10). The Port also set a 
record in handling the ubiquitous 20-foot equivalent (TEU) containers in 2013 
and likely also will exceed that number in 2014 (see Graph 11). Further, 
the Port has been grabbing market share away from its major East Coast 
competitors – New York/New Jersey, Savannah and Charleston. Graph 12 
demonstrates that the Port has decisively reversed the decline in East Coast 
market share that it suffered 2007 through 2011 and, counting 2014, will 
have increased its market share three years in a row.
One indicator of the Port’s recent success is the increase in the 
proportion of containers that have been moving out of the Port 
by means of rail rather than trucks (see Graph 13). A significant 
proportion of truck cargo leaving the Port is “captive,” that is, it is cargo that 
is most likely to be carried by truck from the Port because we are closest to the 
customers and have a cost advantage in this method of delivery. One can draw 
a radius around the Port of Virginia extending as much as 250 miles in some 
directions, and high proportions of the cargo delivered within that radius are 
captive because we enjoy a delivery cost advantage compared to more distant 
ports such as New York/New Jersey or Savannah.  
The same cannot be said for prospective customers located in metropolitan 
areas such as Columbus, Detroit, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati and Cleveland. 
Multiple ports can and do compete for this cargo, which typically is delivered 
via rail. It is a good sign that the Port of Virginia’s market share is increasing in 
this highly competitive arena. We are competing and winning in a very tough 
environment for “discretionary” cargo.  
The good news does not stop there. Because the Port of Virginia is the largest 
deepwater port on the East Coast (and will remain so for several years), we can 
handle larger ships than most of our competitors. Graph 14 reports that 
there has been a general upward trend in the average number 
of TEUs handled by the Port of Virginia per single vessel 
call. Not only is this good for business, but also it enables the Port to realize 
economies of scale and potentially to exert control on its costs and prices as we 
continue to invest in Port infrastructure.   
In addition, the Port of Virginia is realizing dividends from Norfolk Southern 
Corp.’s Heartland Rail Corridor, which, among other things, allows double 
stacking of TEUs headed to the Midwest; from CSX Corp.’s on-dock rail services 
at Portsmouth’s APM Terminals; and from more “first-in, last-out” service by ships 
coming and going to and from Hampton Roads.
Why, then, the current angst over the Port’s performance? Why did The 
Virginian-Pilot’s editorial board choose to label the recent past a “legacy 
of chaos?” (June 1, 2014). First, the Port (as outlined in previous State of 
the Region reports) has been losing money, if one accepts the precepts 
of accountants and economists. Indeed, the Port recently has been in the 
unenviable position of losing money on some of the record number of TEUs that 
it has been handling, in some cases because it sometimes has offered “sale” 
prices for its services. Second, there is growing recognition that there was some 
validity to the assertions of those who were competing to manage the Port 
privately that they could in fact manage it more efficiently by reorganizing its 
operations and instituting new cost controls. Third, and related to reason No. 
2, there is agreement that the previous management structure of the Virginia Port 
Authority (VPA) and its operating arm, the Virginia International Terminals (VIT), 
resulted in overlapping responsibilities, excessive managerial expenditures and 
sometimes-laggard reactions to changing circumstances. Fourth, the Port has 
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suffered from instability; its operational and board leadership has turned over 
several times in just a few years. 
Since late February 2014, the Port has been led by an 
experienced and respected hand, John Reinhart, who knows 
the industry well and understands the range of tasks in front 
of him. Visible changes have occurred in cargo handling, and 
various efficiency-oriented, cost-containing activities are in 
process. The basic outlook for the Port of Virginia is favorable. 
Port activity likely will grow much more rapidly than gross 
regional product; our Port is well situated geographically; 
we are a deepwater port; we benefit from excellent rail 
connections; we have the ability to expand; and our labor 
relations have generally been good.  
The Port of Virginia has been a bright spot, economically speaking, over the 
past few years despite the challenges noted above. At a time when defense 
spending and tourism are stagnant, we have a special need for the Port to 
surmount the challenges facing it and augment its regional leadership role.   
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GRAPH 10
GENERAL CARGO TONNAGE AT THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2014
Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project


























































































General cargo tonnage increased by 7.5 percent in 2013  
and we forecast a 5.6 percent increase in 2014. 
GRAPH 10 
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GRAPH 11
TWENTY-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUS) IN THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2014
Source: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
Twenty-Foot Equivalent Container Units (TEUs)  





























































































TEUs increased by 5.6 percent in 2013 and we forecast a 
4.3 percent increase in 2014. 
GRAPH 11 
REBOUNDING, ALBEIT SLOWLY 23
GRAPH 12
SHARES OF TOTAL LOADED TEU CONTAINERS FOR SELECTED PORTS ON THE EAST COAST, 2006-2014*
Sources: American Association of Port Authorities and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Market shares exclude TEUs for Philadelphia, Miami, Palm Beach and Port Everglades. *Data for 2014 are through April.
16.75%
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Savannah Hampton Roads Charleston New York/New Jersey 
After declining four years in a row, the market share of the Port of Hampton Roads reversed course and 
began to increase in 2012. It has continued to increase and is now above its peak in 2007.  
GRAPH 12 
Shares of Total Loaded TEU Containers for Selected Ports  
on the East Coast, 2006-2014*  
• • II 
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GRAPH 13
MOVEMENT OF CONTAINERS AT THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS BY TYPE OF TRANSPORTATION, 2011-2013
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Rail Barge & Truck Total 
Percentage of containers moved by rail has steadily increased from 30.0% in 2011 to 31.9% in 2012 
and to 33.8% in 2013. Through July 2014, 33.67% of containers have moved by rail.  
GRAPH 13 
Movement of Containers at the Port of Hampton Roads by Type of Transportation, 2011- 3 
• 
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GRAPH 14
AVERAGE TEUs PER CONTAINER VESSEL CALL, 2011-2014*
Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Data for 2013 and 2014 are through April. 
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Average TEUs per container vessel call increased by 3.7 percent in 2012; increased by 
another 8.9 percent in 2013; and increased further by 9.6 percent through April 2014 
compared to TEUs per vessel call through April 2013. 
GRAPH 14 
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Tourism
The sluggish recovery of our tourism industry epitomizes the slow recovery of our 
regional economy. As one can see in Graph 15, total hotel revenues peaked in 
Hampton Roads in 2007 and by 2013 were still $48.6 million (or 6.8 percent) 
below the record 2007 level. In real, inflation-adjusted terms, 2013 revenues 
were 18.6 percent below those of 2007.
Much the same story holds true for REVPAR – revenue received per available 
room. This is the single best indicator of how well a hotel or motel operator is 
doing because it is a measure that takes into account both supply and demand 
(see Table 4). REVPAR in Hampton Roads fell by 10.7 percent between 2007 
and 2013 – and almost 25 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. Virginia Beach, 
which performed the best in our region, suffered a 0.1 percent decline in 
REVPAR in nominal terms over this period, but a more than 14 percent decline 
once price inflation is taken into account.
The long-term shift in tourists away from the Historic Triangle 
(Williamsburg, Jamestown, Yorktown) moderated in 2013, 
but the continuing reality is that the Historic Triangle’s share 
of regional tourism revenues declined from 31.5 percent in 
1999 to 18.3 percent in 2013 (see Graph 16). The winner in 
the market share derby was Virginia Beach, whose share 
increased from 33.2 percent in 1999 to 40.8 percent in 2013. 
While the Historic Triangle has been reducing its supply of rooms (see Graph 
17, which shows a decline in available room nights from 3.45 million in 2005 
to 3.11 million in 2013), this also has been accompanied by a slow attrition in 
the number of actual hotel nights it has sold. Counteracting this long-term trend 
– which appears to reflect a change in the tastes of the public – represents a 
major challenge for the Historic Triangle, which is one of our region’s treasures.  
We will give considerable additional attention to the evolution of the hotel/
motel market in a succeeding chapter, titled “The Answer Is Always Yes,” which 
considers the hotel/motel market in conjunction with the construction of new 
convention centers and arenas. 
TABLE 4




U.S. $65.58 $68.69 +4.7%




Myrtle Beach $54.03 $56.40 +  4.4%
Coastal Carolina $55.83 $56.26 + 0.8%
Ocean City $71.74 $68.81 -  4.1%
Virginia 
Beach
$64.73 $64.64 -  0.1%
Hampton $41.71 $37.45 -10.2%




Norfolk $54.14 $45.95 -15.1%
Williamsburg $47.48 $39.08 -17.7%
Chesapeake/
Suffolk
$52.90 $41.11 - 22.3%
Chesapeake $53.60 $41.18 - 23.2%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, Feb. 17, 2014, and the Old Dominion University Economic 
Forecasting Project  
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GRAPH 15
HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1996-2014














































































Hotel revenues in 2013 were 6.8 percent below the peak observed in 2007 and are 
expected to increase by only 2.8 percent in 2014. 
GRAPH 15 
Hotel Revenue in Hampton Roads, 1996-2014 
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GRAPH 16
ESTIMATED CITY HOTEL MARKET SHARES IN HAMPTON ROADS AS INDICATED BY INDUSTRY REVENUES, 1999 AND 2013





























Estimated City Hotel Market Shares in Hampton Roads   
as Indicated by Industry Revenues, 1999 and 2013  
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GRAPH 17
HOTEL ROOM NIGHTS IN THE HISTORIC TRIANGLE (WILLIAMSBURG) MARKET, 1999-2013
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           GRAPH 17 
Hotel Room Nights in the Historic Triangle (Williamsburg) Market, 
1999-2013 
-
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Housing
From the standpoint of sellers, the market for existing residential homes in 
Hampton Roads continued to improve. As Graph 18 confirms, the average 
number of days that an existing home was on the market before selling 
declined for the second year in a row and the total number of existing homes 
sold increased for the third consecutive year. While the inventory of such 
homes increased slightly, it remains very close to our historical average level 
(see Graph 19). Meanwhile, as Table 5 suggests, 2014 should be the third 
consecutive year that the median sale price of existing residential homes has 
increased, albeit modestly. 
An important reason why the market for existing homes has changed is that 
the number of distressed homes on the market has declined. Graph 20 shows 
that the absolute number of residential foreclosure filings in Hampton Roads is 
continuing to move toward pre-recession levels, while Graph 21 tells us that 
the number of active listings of distressed homes (REO bank-owned homes and 
properties up for bid in a short sale) has fallen almost continuously since peaking 
at 3,224 in November 2010. In 2014, such sales are expected to account 
for roughly one-quarter of all homes sold. This is vitally important to sellers 
because, as Table 6 notes, in 2014 sales prices of REO bank-owned 
properties have been only 55.7 percent of non-distressed sales 
prices, while short sale prices have been only 72.3 percent 
of non-distressed sales prices. Plainly put, sales of distressed 
homes depress sales prices, and not just by a little bit.  
More stringent loan requirements imposed by lenders and our plodding 
economic recovery have made it difficult for many prospective homeowners 
to obtain financing and actually make a home purchase. At the same time, 
the Great Recession put a crimp in the construction of new apartments and 
condominiums. The combination of these factors has driven up rents within 
Hampton Roads. Relatively speaking, it now is much more attractive for 
individuals to purchase a home (instead of renting) than it was five years ago. 
Table 7 underlines this point by comparing the median monthly rent for a three-
bedroom house to the average monthly principal, interest and taxes required to 
purchase a home in our region. The ratio of that rent-to-house payment increased 
from 0.73 in 2007 to 1.45 in 2013.  
At the same time, the average monthly mortgage principal, interest and tax 
payment just mentioned now is only 19.4 percent of median household monthly 
income (see Graph 22). Thus, if you are employed and can obtain mortgage 
financing, this is a splendid time for you to purchase a home.  
TABLE 5
MEDIAN SALE PRICE OF EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES IN 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2014*















Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project.  
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GRAPH 18
EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD AND AVERAGE DAYS ON THE MARKET IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2013
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. Days on market is calculated from the date listed to the date under contract for 
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GRAPH 19
ESTIMATED INVENTORY OF EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES AS MEASURED BY ACTIVE LISTINGS ON MAY 31 OF EACH YEAR
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Currently: 10,281 
High: 13,070 (2010) 
Low: 2,616 (2004) 
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GRAPH 20
HAMPTON ROADS RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE FILINGS, 2006-2013
Sources: RealtyTrac and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Foreclosure filings in Hampton Roads declined 
by only 7.9 percent in 2013, compared to a 
decline of 22.8 percent for Virginia. 
GRAPH 20 
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GRAPH 21
NUMBER OF ACTIVE LISTINGS OF DISTRESSED HOMES (REO AND SHORT SALES) IN HAMPTON ROADS, JUNE 2008 – MAY 2014









May 2014: 1,876 
Peak: 3,224 (November 2010) 
      GRAPH 21 
Number of Active Listings of Distressed Homes (REO and Short Sales) in Hampton Roads, June 
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TABLE 6
AVERAGE PRICE OF EXISTING SHORT SALE, REOS AND NON-
DISTRESSED RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
































































2006 $250,254 $241,666 96.6 $120,817 48.3
2007 $261,723 $237,897 90.9 $163,421 62.4
2008 $255,852 $239,110 93.5 $184,462 72.1
2009 $243,902 $239,913 98.4 $164,229 67.3
2010 $251,572 $231,211 91.9 $151,612 60.3
2011 $236,358 $212,967 90.1 $135,304 57.3
2012 $237,215 $187,527 79.1 $134,535 56.7
2013 $245,344 $180,001 73.4 $131,644 53.7
2014* $235,755 $170,504 72.3 $131,361 55.7
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. 
Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. REOs represent bank-owned homes. 
*Data for 2014 are through May 2014. 
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED HOUSE RENTAL AND 
PRINCIPAL, INTEREST AND TAXES FOR A HOUSE PAYMENT 

















2001 $882 $836 1.19
2002 $911 $861 1.20
2003 $1,037 $890 1.33
2004 $1,044 $1,073 1.11
2005 $1,087 $1,315 0.83
2006 $1,118 $1,533 0.73
2007 $1,164 $1,598 0.73
2008 $1,247 $1,507 0.83
2009 $1,236 $1,307 0.95
2010 $1,277 $1,233 1.04
2011 $1,319 $1,071 1.23
2012 $1,454 $1,015 1.43
2013 $1,570 $1,080 1.45
Sources: HUD and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Monthly payments are calculated 
assuming that the buyer has a 30-year mortgage. It is assumed that real estate tax rate is 1 percent and 
the tax reduction received by homeowners would compensate for homeowners insurance and maintenance 
expenditures.
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 201436
GRAPH 22
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR A MEDIAN PRICE RESALE HOUSE AS A PERCENTAGE OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD 
MONTHLY INCOME IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1979-2013
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GRAPH 22 
Housing Affordability: Monthly Payment for a Median Price Resale House as a Percentage of Median Household 
Monthly Income in Hampton Roads and the U.S., 1979-2013 
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Summing It Up And A Quick 
Look At The Future
We have reasons to be pleased that our regional economy 
is growing modestly despite DOD spending within Hampton 
Roads remaining slightly below its 2012 peak. Overall, our tourism 
industry has grown at a modest pace since the end of the Great Recession. 
Continued growth in the national economy will help accelerate the recovery of 
our hotels and motels, but experience demonstrates that their prosperity is rather 
sensitive to federal spending levels, including DOD spending. Until federal 
spending recovers, our hotels and motels, as a group, are not likely to prosper 
as they did pre-recession.
Despite some turmoil and issues, the Port has been expanding both in size and 
market share and has become an increasingly important economic engine for 
Hampton Roads.    
Our regional housing market turned the corner at least a year ago, but it is not 
likely to do extremely well until federal spending in general and DOD spending 
in particular turn upward.  
All of this adds up to an outlook of modest growth that is below our recent 
historical norms. Table 8 documents that Hampton Roads grew 
at the rate of 1.89 percent in 2013 (after removing price 
inflation), but we estimate only a 1.54 percent real rate of 
growth in 2014. The 2015 outlook is for more of the same, but international 
crises that push DOD spending upward and/or inflate oil prices could easily 
alter this projection.
Graph 23 illustrates where we’ve been and where we believe we are going 
in terms of real, inflation-adjusted economic growth. Our predicted 1.54 
percent regional economic growth rate for 2014 will find us 
trailing both Virginia (predicted 1.76 percent) and the U.S. 
(predicted 1.94 percent). Unfortunately, the Commonwealth now faces 
its own economic challenges, as slumping state tax collections reveal. Three 
Northern Virginia counties rank among the top 10 in the U.S. in terms of their 
total loss of jobs in 2014. At the same time, the coal industry in Southwest 
Virginia is under environmental siege. Hence, we cannot anticipate much 
economic stimulus (for example, that coming from tourists) from the rest of the 
Commonwealth.
In the 2013 State of the Region report, we observed that “It could have been 
worse.” While hardly satisfying, this assessment remains on target.
TABLE 8
ESTIMATED HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT 










2000 50.35 61.49 4.64
2001 52.34 62.49 1.62
2002 55.72 65.51 4.84
2003 59.58 68.67 4.83
2004 63.31 71.02 3.42
2005 67.93 73.84 3.97
2006 72.29 76.25 3.26
2007 75.99 78.07 2.40
2008 77.50 78.10 0.03
2009 78.46 78.46 0.47
2010 80.03 79.07 0.77
2011 81.64 79.11 0.05
2012 84.84 80.79 2.13
2013 87.71 82.31 1.89
2014 90.27 83.58 1.54
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data incorporate U.S. Department of 
Commerce personal income revisions through November 2013. Base year is 2009.
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GRAPH 23
RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP (U.S.), GSP (VIRGINIA) AND GRP (HAMPTON ROADS)
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data on GDP incorporate latest BEA revisions through June 11, 2014. 
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